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NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
_____________ 
 
No. 12-1960 
_____________ 
 
JEFFREY DUNBAR REIFF, 
 
       Appellant 
 
v. 
 
CHAD T. MARKS, in his individual capacity and in his official capacity as a police 
officer; BOROUGH OF WEST READING; EDWARD FABRIZIANI, in his individual 
capacity and in his official capacity as chief of police;  
WEST READING BOROUGH POLICE DEPARTMENT 
 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania 
(No. 5-08-cv-05963) 
District Judge:  Honorable Cynthia M. Rufe 
 
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a) 
January 15, 2013 
____________ 
 
Before:  SMITH, CHAGARES, and BARRY, Circuit Judges. 
 
(Filed: January 22, 2013) 
____________ 
 
OPINION  
____________ 
 
CHAGARES, Circuit Judge. 
 In December 2008, Jeffrey Reiff filed a complaint under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against 
the Borough of West Reading (the “Borough”), the West Reading Borough Police 
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Department, Borough police officer Chad Marks, and Borough police chief Edward 
Fabriziani based on Marks’s use of a TASER on Reiff during an arrest.  The District 
Court dismissed several claims and granted partial summary judgment against Reiff, 
eliminating all defendants except for Marks.  In March 2012, a jury returned a verdict in 
favor of Marks on all remaining claims, and the District Court entered judgment in his 
favor.  Reiff now appeals, challenging the District Court’s summary judgment order in 
favor of the Borough and several of its trial rulings.  We will affirm the order and 
judgment of the District Court.   
I. 
 We write solely for the parties and will therefore recount only those facts that are 
essential to our disposition.  On January 5, 2007, Reiff was driving an automobile in 
West Reading, Pennsylvania.  Officer Marks observed that Reiff’s vehicle was illegally 
stopped in an intersection.  Marks turned on his emergency lights and sirens in order to 
make a traffic stop.  Reiff did not immediately pull his car over, but proceeded several 
blocks and made four turns before stopping his car in a parking lot.  After stopping, 
Reiff exited his car and began to approach Marks’s patrol car.  Marks initially drew his 
service weapon, but then holstered it and instead drew a TASER.  Reiff allegedly told 
Marks to “fuck off,” began to walk away from Marks, and ignored Marks’s commands 
to stop and get on the ground.  Marks approached Reiff and discharged his TASER, 
causing Reiff to fall to the ground.  According to Marks, Reiff continued to refuse to 
cooperate; because of his concern that he could not safely handcuff Reiff without the 
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assistance of another officer, Marks discharged the TASER three more times.  Soon, 
another officer arrived at the scene and handcuffed Reiff.   
 In his complaint, Reiff alleged that he was injured due to Marks’s use of the 
TASER and asserted that the TASER discharges were unnecessary and excessive.  Reiff 
also claimed that the police department failed to train Marks properly on use of the 
TASER.   In July of 2009, the District Court dismissed the West Reading Borough 
Police Department from the case and dismissed several claims against other defendants.  
Later, the District Court granted summary judgment in favor of the Borough and 
Fabriziani, but partially denied Marks’s summary judgment motion because there were 
disputes of fact as to the reasonableness of his TASER use.  After a trial, a jury found 
that Marks did not intentionally use excessive force against Reiff in violation of the 
Constitution.  Reiff now argues, inter alia, that the District Court erred in granting 
summary judgment in favor of the Borough, allowing an improper remark during 
Marks’s closing statement, and refusing to give the jury an adverse inference charge.   
II.
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A. 
 Reiff’s complaint alleged that the Borough was liable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for 
failure to train Marks to properly use the TASER.  Specifically, Reiff claimed that the 
police department lacked proper supervision and that its policy failed to instruct officers 
that if they decided use of the TASER was necessary, they should discharge it as few 
                                              
1
 The District Court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331.  We have appellate 
jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. 
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times as possible.  The District Court granted summary judgment in favor of the 
Borough, concluding that there was “no evidence that the Borough showed a deliberate 
indifference to the constitutional rights of its citizens.”  Appendix (“App.”) 28a.   Reiff 
points to trial testimony and his own list of alleged facts about the police department’s 
training program to support his conclusion that the District Court erred and that the 
police department’s “loosey-goosey policy resulted in the Taser being used as a party 
game.”  Reiff Br. 22.   
 We need not review the merits of the District Court’s grant of summary judgment 
in favor of the Borough because a municipality may not be held liable on a failure to 
train theory when a jury has found that the plaintiff has suffered no constitutional 
violation.  City of Los Angeles v. Heller, 475 U.S. 796, 799 (1986) (explaining that no 
Supreme Court “cases authorize[] the award of damages against a municipal corporation 
based on the actions of one of its officers when in fact the jury has concluded that the 
officer inflicted no constitutional harm”).  This Court has embraced the Supreme Court 
holding in Heller on several occasions.  See, e.g., Hill v. Borough of Kutztown, 455 F.3d 
225, 245 (3d Cir. 2006); Grazier ex rel. White v. City of Philadelphia, 328 F.3d 120, 124 
(3d Cir. 2003) (“The District Court correctly determined that any error in granting 
judgment for the City at the close of the plaintiffs’ case would have been rendered 
harmless by the jury’s verdict of no liability against [defendant police officers].”).2   
                                              
2
  It is true that Heller may have left the door open for claims against a municipality 
despite a jury verdict in favor of the defendant officer if the jury found in the officer’s 
favor based on a good faith defense.  475 U.S. at 798.   Yet, as in Heller, the District 
Court here did not instruct the jury on a good faith or qualified immunity defense; the 
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 Reiff’s briefs do not address Heller or any subsequent case law concerning the 
impossibility of holding the Borough liable if the jury verdict in Marks’s favor is upheld.  
Because we will uphold the jury verdict, we will affirm the District Court’s grant of 
summary judgment in favor of the Borough. 
B. 
 Reiff also argues that the District Court erred by overruling his objection to a 
comment made during closing arguments.  In summarizing the events leading to Reiff’s 
arrest, Marks’s counsel stated:  “Folks, it’s not a traffic ticket, it’s fleeing and evading, 
and then resisting arrest.”  App. 1086a.  Reiff objected, arguing that “[t]here’s nothing 
about resisting in this case,” but the District Court overruled the objection, saying only, 
“[t]his is argument.”  Id.  Reiff now asks for a new trial based on the District Court’s 
decision.  He cites no law in support of his request, but asserts that “the jury was 
affirmatively misled by defense counsel into believing that the act of walking away 
constituted resisting arrest giving the Defendant the right to taser the Plaintiff and shoot 
him in the back.”  Reiff Br. 31.   
 We review the District Court’s decision for abuse of discretion, and will grant a 
new trial only where an attorney’s allegedly improper statements or conduct make it 
reasonably probable that the verdict was influenced by the resulting prejudice.  Forrest v. 
Beloit Corp., 424 F.3d 344, 351 (3d Cir. 2005).  “Because the trial judge was present 
                                                                                                                                                  
jury answered “no” to its second interrogatory, which asked:  “[D]id Defendant Officer 
Chad Marks intentionally commit an act under color of state law that violated Plaintiff 
Jeffrey Reiff’s Fourth Amendment right not to be subject to excessive force?”  App. 
1145a. 
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and able to judge the impact of counsel's remarks, we defer to [her] assessment of the 
prejudicial impact.”  Fineman v. Armstrong World Indus., Inc., 980 F.2d 171, 207 (3d 
Cir. 1992). 
 There was no abuse of discretion here.  The District Court made clear that defense 
counsel was simply making an argument, and the court gave no indication that counsel’s 
characterization was correct or should be relied upon by the jury.  See App. 1101 
(District Court explaining to jury that attorney arguments are not evidence).  Further, 
given the minor and isolated nature of the comment and the fact that the jury was well 
aware of both parties’ versions of what occurred prior to Marks’s use of the TASER, the 
District Court was well within its discretion to conclude that use of the term did not 
generate prejudice that could influence the verdict.  Accordingly, we will not grant a 
new trial because of defense counsel’s use of the term “resisting arrest” in closing 
arguments. 
C. 
 Reiff also urges us to order a new trial because the District Court refused to give 
an adverse inference charge to the jury about data that was lost when the police 
department sent the TASER in for repairs. 
  Reiff’s arrest took place on January 5, 2007, but he did not file this lawsuit until 
almost two years after that.  During the litigation, Reiff discovered that the police 
department sent the TASER used in the arrest for repairs in August of 2007, and that the 
data stored in the TASER had been erased while it was being repaired.  Thus, as Reiff 
argued to the District Court, he was unable to verify the amount of voltage officer Marks 
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used or the number and duration of discharges.  Reiff asked the District Court if he could 
cross-examine Marks about the loss of the data,
3
 and also requested that the court give the 
jury an adverse inference charge because of the department’s failure to preserve the data.  
After a somewhat lengthy discussion concerning the TASER manual and the timing of 
the lawsuit, the District Court denied Reiff’s requests.    
  “When the contents of a document are relevant to an issue in a case, the trier of 
fact generally may receive the fact of the document’s nonproduction or destruction as 
evidence that the party that has prevented production did so out of the well-founded fear 
that the contents would harm him.”  Brewer v. Quaker State Oil Ref. Corp., 72 F.3d 326, 
334 (3d Cir. 1995) (affirming district court’s decision not to draw adverse inference 
because it was not clearly erroneous to find that destruction of evidence was unrelated to 
lawsuit).  However, to apply the inference, “it must appear that there has been an actual 
suppression or withholding of the evidence.”  Id.  Here, the District Court acted within its 
discretion to deny Reiff’s request.  Reiff failed to demonstrate that the police department 
had any duty to preserve the evidence for more than seven months when no litigation was 
pending.   He also failed to demonstrate that by sending the TASER for repairs seven 
months after the arrest, the department was purposely destroying data.  We therefore hold 
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  Though one of the section headings in Reiff’s brief indicates that he also wishes to 
challenge the District Court’s decision to disallow cross-examination, he makes no 
argument to that effect.  In any event, given the fact that Reiff could not show the 
department had any duty to preserve the TASER data, we conclude that it was not an 
abuse of discretion to determine that such a cross-examination would cause prejudice or 
lack sufficient relevance.  See Douglas v. Owens, 50 F.3d 1226, 1230 (3d Cir. 1995) 
(discussing standard of review and emphasizing district court’s wide latitude in limiting 
scope of cross-examination). 
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that it was proper for the District Court to conclude that the loss of data did not 
“indicate[] fraud and a desire to suppress the truth.”  Id.  Accordingly, we will uphold the 
District Court’s decision to refuse Reiff’s request to provide the jury with an adverse 
inference instruction.
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III. 
  For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the order and judgment of the District 
Court. 
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  We can discern at least one additional argument in Reiff’s brief, though the relief he 
seeks is unclear.  One section of the brief raises the “important policy question” of 
whether “if municipal police officers cannot arrest an offender for a traffic offense, can 
they taser the offender.”  Reiff Br. 24.   Based on his conclusion that the arrest was 
improper, Reiff argues that after he parked the car and began to walk away, Marks should 
have simply taken the car’s registration number and mailed a citation to the owner of the 
car.  Id. 27.  None of the arguments contained in this section of Reiff’s brief persuade us 
to alter the District Court’s judgment.  
